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What does Artificial Intelligence (AI) have to contribute to 
health care? And what should we be looking out for if we are 
worried about its risks? In this paper we offer a survey, and initial 
evaluation, of hopes and fears about the applications of artificial 
intelligence in medicine. AI clearly has enormous potential as a 
research tool, in genomics and public health especially, as well as a 
diagnostic aid. It’s also highly likely to impact on the 
organisational and business practices of healthcare systems in ways 
that are perhaps under-appreciated. Enthusiasts for AI have held 
out the prospect that it will free physicians up to spend more time 
attending to what really matters to them and their patients. We will 
argue that this claim depends upon implausible assumptions about 
the institutional and economic imperatives operating in 
contemporary healthcare settings. We will also highlight important 
concerns about privacy, surveillance, and bias in big data, as well as 
the risks of over trust in machines, the challenges of transparency, 
the deskilling of healthcare practitioners, the way AI reframes 
healthcare, and the implications of AI for the distribution of power 
in healthcare institutions. We will suggest that two questions, in 
particular, are deserving of further attention from philosophers and 
bioethicists. What does care look like when one is dealing with data 
as much as people? And, what weight should we give to the advice 
of machines in our own deliberations about medical decisions? 
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AI encompasses a vast range of diverse technologies, and AI 
research cuts across a variety of disciplines including computer 
science, philosophy of mind, logic, neuroscience, and theoretical 
biology. As such, a precise definition is difficult. For our purposes, 
though, it will suit to suggest that AI deals with the creation of 
machines capable of acting rationally or intelligently (Norvig and 
Russell 2003).  
Famously, the initiators of the AI research program in the 
mid-1950s thought that it would only take a few months to bear fruit. 
After some early successes, the 1970s and 80s saw a significant drop in 
funding and excitement about AI – the so-called AI winter. However, 
recent advances in machine learning, and especially “deep learning”, 
prompted by the increase in available computing power and 
emergence of large datasets as a result of the Internet, have led to its 
re-emergence into the foreground of public awareness: an ‘AI spring’ 
is now blooming. Machine learning involves the creation of machines 
able to learn (semi-)autonomously from experience. Deep learning is a 
type of machine learning technique that uses so-called ‘deep’ neural 
networks (i.e. networks consisting of multiple hidden layers) to 
generate impressively accurate predictions and classifications. These 
networks are inspired by the neural architecture of the human brain, in 
that they consist of a complex network of interconnected ‘neurons’. An 
important application of deep learning, especially relevant to the 
applications of AI in medicine, is natural language processing, which 
involves the creation of models able to identify, process, and perform 
actions in response to written text and/or to speech.  
Medicine is one of the areas where there is the most enthusiasm 
about the application of AI. There are at least four reasons for this. 
First, AI is heavily reliant upon the availability of large-scale, varied 
datasets – so-called ‘big’ data. The digitisation of modern healthcare 
has generated an enormous amount of data that AI can take advantage 
of. Data currently being stored in electronic health records, for 
instance, is expected to be the first port of call for large scale 
developments and applications of medical AI, in addition to the data 
that has proliferated from wearables (e.g. FitBits), online patient 
forums (e.g. PatientsLikeMe), even credit card transactions (Weber, 
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Mandl, and Kohane 2014).  Second, people care about — and are 
willing to spend money on — their health, meaning that there is money 
to be made. Technology corporations, small and large, are hoping to 
capitalise on this new domain of healthcare technology, and so are 
investing heavily. Third, by improving health, AI has significant 
potential to help people, so there are many good people passionately 
dedicating themselves to this end. Finally, governments are very 
concerned about the size of their healthcare budgets and hope that, by 
identifying which treatments work and which don’t as well as by 
discovering new drugs and new treatments, AI might help them reduce 
the cost of healthcare.1 
 
 
Our purposes here are inevitably, for the most part, critical, in the 
service of what we hope is the laudable goal of drawing attention to 
ethical and political problems that need to be addressed in order to 
maximise the benefits and minimise the risks from the application of 
AI in healthcare. It is therefore important that we clearly state at the 
outset our belief that AI does have tremendous promise when it comes 
to the goals of medicine. In particular, we anticipate that AI will 
ultimately produce significant benefits in the area of research, 
diagnosis, and medical administration. In this section, we also consider 
its potential to “rehumanise” medicine by facilitating more and better 
communication between physicians and patients. 
 
(1) 
Increasingly, research in biology and medicine involve 
generating, manipulating, and analysing large datasets. One of AI’s 
primary strengths is its ability to identify patterns in data, where these 
might escape human beings, and for this reason AI has extraordinary 
potential as a tool for medical research.  
AI is already being applied in research application in genomics, 
drug discovery and design, and to data mine EHR systems to identify 
novel and clinically useful phenotypes and biomarkers of illness. 
Research on genomics is highly reliant on big data and sophisticated 
algorithms play a crucial role in genetic sequencing as well as in 
 
(1)  Unfortunately, the economics of healthcare suggests that technological advances in 
medicine actually contribute to, rather than reduce, the total cost of healthcare, 
mostly because the total amount governments spend on each individual only 
increases with life expectancy, as older people have more complex medical needs 
(Callahan 2009). 




genome wide association studies. AI is being used to assist in the 
development of new drug compounds, through the prediction and 
identification of potentially productive and efficacious molecules. For 
instance, Deep Mind’s “Alphafold” AI uses machine learning to 
generate models of proteins based on their genetic sequences 
(AlQuraishi 2019). Additionally, AI has been applied for the purpose 
of data mining EHR systems to discover information relevant to 
individual patients as well as information about populations (Chen et 
al. 2017). There is also significant potential for AI to use novel sources 
of data, including that generated by mobile devices and individuals’ 
activity online, to generate new findings in public health.  
The uptake of AI for medical research has been more rapid than in 
clinical practice, due the more demanding regulatory regime that 
governs clinical applications of new technologies.  The relative lack of 
regulatory oversight of research is one reason to be somewhat cautious 
about the claims made on behalf of AI.  Another is the fact that, owing 
to the rate of rapid progress in the area, many of these claims have been 
made on the basis of papers that have appeared on prepress servers 
rather than in the refereed literature. It is also worth noting that 
research using AI often raises significant ethical issues relating to 
consent to the use of data that have not always been handled well 
(Kahn 2017). Finally, it is important to acknowledge here that, despite 
its treatment in the popular press, AI isn’t magic. The findings based 
upon AI still rely on having good sources of data, a good 
understanding of data, good understanding of causal relations, and 
good experimental design.2 Human error in the interpretation of an AI 
system’s result can lead even the most sophisticated AI astray. These 
reasons for caution when it comes to some of the less critical claims 
about AI are, however, no reason to deny the general claim that AI is 




Barely a week goes by without some new announcement about AI 
outperforming human physicians in some diagnostic task. In 
particular, ‘deep learning’ has shown significant potential for 
diagnosis in the context of medical imaging. For instance, there have 
been some promising results in the use of AI in diagnosing diabetic 
retinopathy (Gulshan et al. 2016), skin cancers (Esteva et al. 2017), 
 
(2)  This is especially important given that the reasoning of most AI systems does not 
factor in causation: their results are based exclusively upon correlations contained 
within a dataset. 
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and breast cancer (Golden 2017), among others. Consequently, 
medical disciplines that are heavily reliant upon the analysis of 
medical images are frequently considered to be most likely to be 
disrupted by the deployment of medical AI – dermatology, radiology, 
pathology, etc. Indeed, attempts are already being made to reorient 
these professions toward modified roles and duties that enable a 
productive relationship between AI systems and clinicians (Jha and 
Topol 2016).  
Attempts have also been made to apply AI to diagnosis and 
treatment recommendation outside of medical imaging. A number of 
researchers are developing AI systems to work with clinical data 
produced by ECGs or medical monitoring devices used in ICUs in 
order to predict the future trajectory of patients’ conditions: in many 
ways such systems do not seem all that different to the kind of 
algorithmic medicine that has been practised in ICUs for the last 
several decades. However, some teams have much more ambitious 
agendas for AI. Notoriously, for instance, IBM’s Watson utilises both 
machine learning and natural language processing to trawl through the 
medical literature in order to better recommend treatments for patients 
(Somashekhar et al. 2017). While initial reporting about Watson 
tended to be wildly enthusiastic, it is fair to say that subsequent 
commentary has been more mixed (Strickland 2018). Nevertheless, 
Watson is undoubtedly significant as an indicator of the scope of the 
ambitions that AI researchers have when it comes to the role that AI 
might play in medicine in the future. Indeed, some pundits are now 
imagining that AI will finally realise the long-heralded potential of 
“personalised medicine” by analysing the patient’s entire genome, as 
well as multiple lifestyle factors, before recommending treatment for 
their condition (Topol 2019). 
It is important to note, though, that there is more excitement about 
the potential of AI for diagnosis than actual clinical application. Most 
studies comparing the performance of clinicians and AI systems in 
diagnostic tasks have suffered from significant methodological 
limitations (Liu et al. 2019). As such, few of the promising results have 
been clinically validated. It’s one thing for an AI to replicate or exceed 
the performance of human beings at some classification task after 
access to a properly labelled dataset. It’s another for an AI to go 
transistor to toe with human beings in medical diagnosis as it happens 
in reality.  
 
(3) 
AI also has lots of promise in an area that is less glamorous: 
medical administration.  




Computers and expert systems already play an important role in 
the complex scheduling tasks that are central to modern hospitals and 
healthcare systems, as well as in purchasing and billing systems, and 
medical data management more generally. AI will enable institutions 
to automate more of these business processes and to increase their 
efficiency. In the near future, AI systems will bill patients, roster staff, 
manage inventories, monitor employee performance, and schedule 
surgeries. As natural language interfaces improve, patients first contact 
with medical institutions may well be with an AI, which will make 
appointments for them, or direct them to the appropriate person to 
assist them with their enquiries. 
Another, related, area where AI looks set to have a large impact is 
in the insurance industry. The business model of insurance industry is 
based around insurers being better able to identify, quantify, and 
manage risks than their clients. Because the large insurance agencies 
insure — and process claims from — millions of customers, they have 
correspondingly large datasets. If they can leverage AI to gain an 
improved understanding of risks and risk profiles, they will be able to 
improve their market share and/or profit margins by offering lower 
premiums. Of course, it is also possible that insurers might discover 
that it simply isn’t worth offering insurance to certain customers or 
classes of customers. In order to secure insurance, people with high 
medical needs, or poor risk profiles must be able to pool their risk with 
a larger group of people with lower risk profiles. However, the more 
accurately insurers are able to estimate risk, the more they are able to 
distinguish between different pools. Some individuals with complex 
medical conditions, or who are otherwise at high risk of requiring 
expensive treatment, may eventually find that the pools in which they 
are placed are small and include only other patients with similar risk 
profiles, with the result that they are unable to afford the premiums 
available to them (Price and Cohen 2019). 
AI is also likely to play a role in Managed Care. With more data 
on patients and the success rates of various treatments, managed care 
organisations will be better placed to estimate both the likelihood and 
probable extent of benefits to particular patients from particular 
treatments and also the cost of providing them. AIs may effectively 
become the gatekeepers that determine who gets access to what care, 
when, and for how long. Indeed, there is evidence that this is already 
taking place (Lecher 2018) 
Patients are unlikely to be terribly enthusiastic about the 
applications of AI in these domains. Notwithstanding the amount of 
effort that is going into providing machines with emotional 
intelligence, the experience of dealing with AI is likely to be an 
impersonal one, and perhaps an alienating one. Even if AI systems are 
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more efficient than existing telephone queues and institutional 
bureaucracies, patients are unlikely to feel empowered by their 
interactions with them. As we discuss further below, in some cases, 
they may well be disempowered. As we also discuss further below, the 
use of “black box” systems to determine who gets access to healthcare 
also raises questions about procedural justice and respect for persons. 
That being said, patients will also benefit from a more efficient 




It is by now widely acknowledged by clinicians that patients as 
individual persons have drifted to the periphery of medicine over the 
last half-century (Cassell 1997; Gawande 2014; Topol 2019). Treating 
the disease or disorder has now become the primary focus. Many 
plausible explanations have been given for this phenomena: the rise of 
managed care (Mechanic 2011), the creation of large and impersonal 
medical institutions, the various conflicts of interests that have been 
introduced into the doctor-patient relationship (Rodwin 1993). EHR 
systems have been an especially detrimental addition to the 
doctor-patient relationship, impeding communication (Toll 2012), 
increasing administrative burden (Hill, Sears, and Melanson 2013), 
and contributing to physician burnout and depression (Friedberg et al. 
2013). Abraham Verghese (2008) complains that medicine is now 
more concerned with treating the iPatient – the digitised collection of 
scans, documents, and data – than the individual flesh-and-blood 
patient. 
A number of authors have suggested that AI has significant 
potential to counter this trend and make the practice of medicine “more 
human” (Israni and Verghese 2019; Meskó, Hetényi, and Győrffy 
2018; Topol 2019). In particular, they suggest, automating the input 
and retrieval of patient data with AI might allow clinicians to return the 
patient to the centre of their attention.  ‘One of [AI’s] most important 
effects’, claims Eric Topol, ‘will come from unshackling clinicians 
from electronic health records’ (Topol 2019: 288).  
It is not entirely clear what this group of thinkers anticipates that 
machines will be doing to relieve physicians of the demands of data. 
Given the reliance of AI systems upon enormous datasets, one might 
think that advances in AI will only generate further demands on 
physicians when it comes to their interactions with IT systems 
(Maddox, Rumsfeld, and Payne 2019). Indeed, the introduction of AI 
will itself generate an incentive to measure and collect more data, 
especially given that physicians will presumably need to monitor the 




performance of AI systems and also the outcomes for patients from the 
use of AI (Verghese, Shah, and Harrington 2019). In order to reduce 
the burdens described above, AI systems would have to be capable of 
gathering data without making further demands on human beings to 
respond to or manipulate it.  
It is possible that natural language processing will become 
advanced enough that a machine could take notes of verbal 
doctor-patient interactions and perhaps even extract out those elements 
that are most clinically relevant. However, it’s hard to imagine that 
physicians would not have to at least look over these transcripts to 
ensure that significant information has not been missed. It’s also 
possible that “virtual clinical assistants” might trawl through the 
patient’s data, and also the relevant medical literature – as is the goal of 
Watson — and draw the attention of the physician to only that 
information that is medically relevant. This would be an ambitious 
application of AI and would raise many of the issues we discussed 
below to a large degree. Moreover, again, unless physicians were 
willing to concede to becoming handmaidens of diagnostic AI’s, it 
seems that they would need to confirm the AI’s decision through their 
own deliberations. It’s also likely that concerns about the legal liability 
of the manufacturer of the AI would lead to such AI being programmed 
to err on the side of inclusivity in such searches and, similarly, to 
physicians being required to read everything that the machine flagged 
as possibly relevant. Perversely, then, such systems might actually 
require doctors to look at more rather than less data. 
Another reason to be sceptical that AI will increase the amount of 
time physicians have to spend time with patients derives from the 
economics of the provision of healthcare. Once prevention of disease 
and illness starts to be conceived of as part of the role of medicine, the 
demand for healthcare is near infinite. There is no guarantee that 
hospitals and other healthcare organisations will not simply take 
advantage of whatever efficiencies are generated by AI to move more 
patients through the system instead of allowing physicians to spend 
more time per patient. Indeed, given that patient ‘care’ is subtle and 
hard to measure, in contrast to the easily quantifiable amount of 
patients treated or procedures performed, there is every reason to think 
that institutions may tend to do precisely this. At this stage, then, the 
idea that AI will re-humanise medicine remains a commendable 
ambition rather than a reliable forecast. Realising this ambition will 
require both clever design of AI and a concerted campaign by the 
medical profession to resist the economic and institutional imperatives 
that might otherwise lead to the benefits of AI accruing primarily to 
institutions at the expense of the experience of doctors and patients. 
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If AI holds out the prospect of enormous benefits, it also involves 
significant risks, which we survey and evaluate below. After first 
discussing four important issues, which have already received a 
significant amount of attention in the literature — privacy, 
surveillance, bias in big data, and “explainability” — we then move on 
to consider a number of issues that have received less attention to date, 
including:  AI’s impact on trust in medicine; its potential to deskill 
physicians; the danger that AI might render healthcare systems more 
fragile by introducing single points of failure; the likely impacts of AI 
on the distribution of power within healthcare institutions and systems; 
the vexed question of responsibility for decisions involving AI; the 
way in which AI may reframe healthcare; the future of care in 
AI-enhanced medicine; and, the enduring importance of arguments 
about values for the future of healthcare. 
 
(1) 
Ensuring the privacy of sensitive medical information has 
become an increasingly challenging affair in the digital age of 
medicine. Digital technologies (e.g. EHR systems) have been 
instrumental in the effort to make patient information more easily 
accessible for both physicians and patients themselves. Unlike records 
stored on paper, electronic data is easily, and infinitely, reproducible, 
which makes it more accessible to non-healthcare organisations (e.g. 
governments, employers, and insurance agencies). Strong limitations 
that existed for those looking to gain access to paper records have often 
been weakened in the course of the adoption of digital storage of data. 
Additionally, electronic data is vulnerable to remote access and 
manipulation and thus to theft. Cyberattacks on medical organisations 
are becoming increasingly common due to a variety of economic 
incentives (Kruse et al. 2017). 
These sorts of breaches of medical confidentiality can harm 
patients in a number of ways. Patients may feel embarrassed, or 
ashamed by the idea that someone knows about their sensitive medical 
condition(s). They can cause patients with certain stigmatised illnesses 
to be alienated from their communities. They can reduce a person’s 
opportunities for employment. They can even lead to unwarranted 
increases in health insurance costs. More fundamentally, insofar as 
privacy is concerned with control over information, patients are 
harmed by being made more vulnerable to the scrutiny of others, even 
if no one actually chooses to access their information. 




The increased application of AI in medicine will greatly intensify 
the threat to privacy in the digital age both by driving the collection of 
more data and also by increasing the range of uses to which data may 
be put. The fact that AIs require millions of datapoints for their training 
provides an incentive to researchers to “hoover” up any and all 
available data. The sorts of data that may enable an AI to make 
predictions relevant to healthcare outcomes also include data 
generated outside of the healthcare system, such as histories of activity 
online or information about an individual’s lifestyle gathered by 
various apps or wearable devices. AI also dramatically increases the 
amount that can be gleaned from this data and thus the amount that 
people have at stake when it comes to the question of who can access 
it. 
Optimists continue to hope that privacy can be maintained 
through technical measures. In particular, it might be thought that 
privacy can be preserved through the deidentification of medical data. 
But there are two problems here. Firstly, as we’ve noted, it is 
sometimes possible to determine health related information about an 
individual based on non-medical data. A salutary example of this 
occurred when Target revealed the pregnancy of a teenage girl to her 
family after having detected this on the basis of her purchasing history 
at the department store (Duhigg 2012). In order to maintain medical 
privacy, then, it would seem necessary for all of our data to be 
deidentified as opposed to mere medical data, which is likely to be 
resisted by many of the companies that gather data insofar as their 
business models rely upon the ability to target advertising to 
individuals. But, secondly, even if all of the data that we generate as 
individuals were systematically deidentified, it is still possible for this 
data to be ‘reidentified’ once the amount of data reaches a certain – 
often surprisingly low – threshold (Gymrek et al. 2013). 
It therefore seems likely that there is a trade-off between privacy 
and the potential healthcare benefits that might be realised through the 
use of AI. Some authors have argued that  we have a duty to forfeit our 
privacy and share our data in order to contribute to a ‘learning’ health 
care system that will be to the benefit of all (Cohen 2018). This 
supposes that everyone has an equal likelihood of benefiting from the 
use of medical AI. However, as we shall see, the potential of AI to 
centralise political and institutional power, as well as the problem of 
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(2) 
Closely related – but not identical to – the threat to privacy is the 
danger of increased surveillance as a result of the capacities of AI. 
Privacy can be violated through the accidental release of data and even 
by the fact that people could access data, even if no one does. 
Surveillance consists in the deliberate gathering of information via the 
active scrutiny of populations. Surveillance may be morally 
problematic even where there is no expectation of privacy. 
AI facilitates surveillance in at least three ways. First, as we’ve 
seen, AI makes it possible to gather more data and to gather new forms 
of data. By integrating information produced by sensors across 
multiple modalities, AI can produce data that is both richer and more 
fine-grained than ever before. Enthusiasm for big data, driven by AI, 
has led to researchers and corporations looking to the data generated 
by people’s online activities, including social media, and mobile 
phones for insights related to their health. Of course, once this data has 
been collected for purposes related to healthcare, it is also available for 
other investigations. Much of this data is now geo-tagged, making it 
possible to track people’s activities through time and space. Second, 
AI makes it much easier to work with large databases and to identify 
patterns within data. AI systems now regularly work with millions of 
records, in databases with many dimensions. Machine learning 
algorithms can identify correlations that are too subtle for human 
beings to observe directly. Third, AI can do all of this automatically, 
without direct human oversight. It can operate 24/7, often in real time, 
flagging relevant findings for human attention as required.  
The capacity of AI to enhance surveillance is a feature as much as 
a bug. For instance, many applications of AI in public health contexts 
or to identify iatrogenic harms rely on surveillance. Interestingly, 
physicians and healthcare workers are themselves likely one of the first 
targets of AI enhanced surveillance in order to monitor their 
performance (Dias, Gupta, and Yule 2018).  
Nevertheless, it is clear that there are also significant ethical and 
political risks here. Part of what is problematic about surveillance is 
the loss of privacy that it involves, but this is not the whole of the 
matter. Surveillance, especially where licensed by the government, 
involves a fundamental change in the relations between organisations 
and individuals; between watcher and the watched. Individuals are 
interpolated — called into existence — as sources of risk. Everyone – 
or everything – is placed under suspicion. They are watched and 
measured, tagged with estimates of risk, and potentially targeted for 
intervention. The fact that individuals are thereby rendered vulnerable 
to the actions of the surveilling party is normatively significant even if 




that party never chooses to act on the basis of the information it has 
gathered (Pettit 1999). As we will discuss further below, the 
introduction of these powerful new tools of surveillance also tends to 
go hand in hand with the centralisation of power within institutions. 
 
(3) 
AI systems are only as good as the data upon which they are 
trained, and when this data is incomplete, unrepresentative, or 
misinterpreted, the results can be catastrophic.  
Outside of medicine, a number of high-profile cases have 
emerged where “bias” in the data used to train AIs have led to 
algorithms that produce discriminatory and/or offensive outputs. 
Typically, these biases disadvantage already marginalised and 
disadvantaged social groups.  One particularly high-profile instance of 
bias was Google’s image recognition software identifying 
African-American faces as those of gorillas (Barr 2015). Similarly, 
online recruitment ads have been shown to present higher paid jobs to 
men and lower paid jobs to women (Spice 2015). The implications of 
bias for machine learning can be especially pernicious if the outputs of 
the AI influence the nature of the data that is subsequently used to train 
it (O'Neil 2016). In such cases, bias may be self-reinforcing. For 
instance, the use of machine learning techniques in predictive policing, 
where police are sent to patrol areas that are identified by an AI – on 
the basis of historical data about where crimes occur, as likely sites of 
future crimes – has been linked to “increasingly disproportionate 
policing of historically over-policed communities” (Lum and Isaac 
2016). In part this is because sending patrol cars to any location will 
result in an increase in reported crime given that it is the task of the 
police to identify and report crime.  By this mechanism, initial 
geographic variation in the reports of crime, often as a result of racist 
policing, may be rapidly amplified.  
The data used for medical research is not now, and is unlikely 
ever to be, free of bias. Sex, class, and gender, all influence who 
presents to hospital, with what conditions, and how they are treated. 
Physicians are, regrettably, not necessarily less susceptible to racism, 
sexism, or other forms of bigotry, than investigators in other sciences. 
There is, therefore, real danger that the use of AI in medicine might 
deepen existing inequities in health and healthcare along the lines of 
race, class, and sex. Particular social groups could be excluded from 
the benefits of medical AI or even actively harmed by medical AI 
systems. One striking example, of the how this might occur, which has 
already received some attention, relates to the use of AI for the 
diagnosis of skin cancers. The datasets that machine learning 
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algorithms are being trained on for this purpose have tended to consist 
almost exclusively of fair-skinned individuals. Consequently, 
Adamson and Smith suggest that ‘[a]lthough there is enthusiasm about 
the expectation that ML [machine learning] technology could improve 
early detection rates, as it stands it is possible that the only populations 
to benefit are those with fair skin’ (Adamson and Smith 2018: 1247).  
Since biases often emerge from poor data collection and 
evaluation methods, it might be thought that engineers will be able to 
design around these problems through sufficiently careful curation and 
testing of data. But bias can emerge in an AI system even when the 
system is trained upon a high-quality datasets. Aggregation bias, for 
instance, results from the use of a one-size-fits-all model for 
populations with different statistical properties. It “‘can lead to a 
model that is not optimal for any group, or a model that is fit to the 
dominant population (if combined with representation bias)”(Suresh 
and Guttag 2019: 5). Suresh and Gutag give the example of clinical aid 
tools for diabetic patients: statistically relevant differences between 
diabetics with different ethnicities mean that, even if there is sufficient 
representation across ethnicities in a training dataset, a one-size-fits-all 
model will not serve the interests of each group equally or well. 
Moreover, at a deeper level, the question of bias must be 
confronted rather than avoided. Data is always selected from a wider 
set of possible datapoints on the basis of assumptions, explicit or 
implicit, about the phenomenon it is being used to investigate. What 
counts as (problematic) “bias” is a methodological — and often an 
ethical — question. Similarly, given enough data an AI will find – or, 
as the example above suggests, obscure — multiple correlations, some 
of which we may wish to factor into our analysis of the phenomenon 
and some of which we way wish to reject as artefacts or on ethical or 
political grounds. Concerns about bias in AI should serve as prompts 
for ongoing conversations about the basis on which we wish to make 




A troubling property of some AI systems is that they may 
function as ‘black boxes’. This is especially the case where an AI 
utilises the complex computational architecture of neural networks. In 
deep learning, neural networks have multiple ‘hidden’ layers that each 
contain a large number of artificial neurons. Each of these neurons 
hold a particular statistical weight or ‘bias’ that influences the final 
output of the system. During training, biases are commonly assigned at 
random and then optimised autonomously through a technique called 




backpropagation, wherein a particular backpropagation algorithm 
moves back through the layers of the network in reverse order, 
adjusting the biases of individual neurons in order to optimise the 
overall performance of the model. The reasoning behind each of these 
innumerable adjustments is not accessible, severely restricting our 
ability to understand or offer an explanation for the systems outputs 
once it has been trained. Perversely, the most accurate and useful AIs 
are often the least explainable (Burrell 2016).  
A number of authors have worried that the opacity of AI systems 
limits the capacity of designers to identify and mitigate risks to patients 
(Cabitza, Rasoini, and Gensini 2017; Terrasse, Gorin, and Sisti 2019; 
Watson et al. 2019). This worry does, however, need to be placed in 
perspective. Lack of explainability is already widely accepted across 
various domains of medical practice. London (2019), for example, 
notes that ‘modern clinicians prescribed aspirin as an analgesic for 
nearly a century without understanding the mechanism through which 
it works. Lithium has been used as a mood stabilizer for half a century, 
yet why it works remains uncertain’ (London 2019: 17). If we can be 
justified in prescribing a drug without being able to explain how it 
works, or why it produces adverse outcomes in some patients but not 
others, then it seems we could be justified in relying on an AI that was 
generally reliable even where we don’t understand how it manages to 
be so. To the extent that we are solely concerned with medical 
outcomes, narrowly conceived, then the difficulty in explaining the 
internal functioning of AI does not distinguish them from other 
lacunae in medicine. 
Yet the practice of medicine involves more than just the cure of 
disease or illness – it also involves relations between persons. 
Explanation and understanding have become increasingly important to 
patients, as evidenced by the turn away from paternalism towards 
patient autonomy in medical ethics and practice over recent decades. 
Patients want to make their own choices about their health, or at least 
share the decision with their doctor. In this context, the opacity of AI 
does indeed appear to be problematic: it deprives patients of the 
opportunity to receive answers about key questions related to their 
treatment. As we shall discuss further below, it also makes it difficult 
to identify the value judgements that have been made in the course of 
reaching a treatment decision or to check that the decision is in 
accordance with the patient’s own values. Moreover, in many contexts, 
medical decisions raise questions of justice, about the allocation of 
resources amongst persons. A Kantian notion of respect for 
autonomous agents requires that we can provide reasons to justify our 
treatment of other people. Ideally, a condition of a purported reason 
being a reason is that it is potentially something that the other party 
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should accept — or at least recognise as normatively relevant to the 
situation. Arguably, the deliberations of black boxes can’t constitute 
reasons in this sense, as we are unable to follow or evaluate them. If 
people want to be able to make medical decisions in accordance with 
their values, or if people are going to be treated differently because of 
the deliberations of a machine, then, we have reason to prefer systems 
that enable us to track the reasons for the conclusions that they reach. 
 
(5) 
The difficulty in explaining the deliberations of AI may also have 
implications for the future of trust in medicine and healthcare systems. 
Trust in one’s clinician has important advantages in any medical 
encounter. It allows one to feel comfortable revealing personal and 
sensitive information to them, to feel confident in their judgement and 
advice, and to comfortably depend upon them in times of ill health and 
vulnerability. For these reasons, trust in one’s clinician has been shown 
to have a positive correlation with improved self-reported health (Hall 
et al. 2001). Yet the likely intrusion of AI into the clinical encounter in 
the near- to mid-future has the potential to hinder the development and 
maintenance of patient trust (Vayena, Blasimme, and Cohen 2018), 
possibly jeopardising some of the benefits that medical AI is expected 
to deliver. The problem of explainability, addressed in the previous 
section, is likely to have significant influence here. “If doctors don’t 
understand why the algorithm made a diagnosis,” as Watson and 
colleagues observe, “then why should patients trust the recommended 
course of treatment?” (Watson et al. 2019: 2). Indeed, the more that 
clinicians and patients come to rely upon the use of medical AI, the 
more that relations of trust may shift away from human clinicians 
toward the AI systems themselves.  
Patients are not the only stakeholders for which trust in AI is 
problematic. Clinicians, too, face challenges here, since they will 
likely be expected to mediate between patients and AI systems 
(Verghese, Shah, and Harrington 2018). It is crucial for patient safety, 
then, that they understand when it is appropriate and inappropriate to 
place their trust in these systems. The problem, however, is that the 
automation of tasks often leads people to both over-trust and 
under-trust these systems in different contexts, with potentially 
disastrous implications. 
Automation bias, for instance, is one example of over-trusting, 
which occurs when people rely too heavily upon systems that they 
have observed over time to be generally accurate, leading to otherwise 
avoidable error. The Therac-25 disaster is one example of this 
phenomenon in medicine. Therac-25 was a computer-controlled 




radiation therapy machine that inadvertently gave radiation overdoses 
to six patients, resulting in serious illnesses and deaths. Troubling 
clinical observations during these overdoses were disregarded because 
the operators of Therac-25 came to mistakenly trust the machine over 
their own expertise (Ash, Berg, and Coeira 2004). The use of AI in 
medicine has significant potential to lead to similar instances of 
over-trust.  
Under-trusting AI might also prove problematic. An existing 
example of under-trust in clinical settings is seen in the phenomenon of 
alert fatigue, where hospital staff come to disregard computerised 
alerts because of their interminable frequency and clinical irrelevancy. 
Under-trust of this sort can lead to avoidable patient harm. Wachter, 
for instance, has detailed an instance wherein a patient received a 
37-fold overdose of antibiotics, despite a number of computerised 
warnings of the error which were ignored because of under-trust in the 
systems’ alerts (Wachter 2015). AI in medicine could have similar 
effects if clinicians come to distrust their outputs or suggestions if 
these outputs are not communicated thoughtfully and effectively, 
which has significant potential to lead to patient harm.  
 
(6) 
The problem of automation bias is exacerbated by de-skilling. 
Changes in the skill-sets of doctors are nothing new and are indeed a 
natural consequence of progress in medicine. Physicians lose skills 
when they rely on machines to perform tasks that they use to perform 
unaided or — perhaps more often nowadays — when they rely upon 
new machines to perform tasks that they use to perform with the 
assistance of older machines; as these tools improve the skills required 
to use previous generations thereof disappear. Deskilling may arise at 
three different loci. Individual physicians may gradually become 
unable to perform tasks that they were once capable of performing, 
owing to lack of practice as a result of a new technology rendering the 
skill redundant. Individual physicians may no longer learn skills that 
were once taught to doctors as new technologies render the old skills 
redundant. Finally, the profession as a whole may lose a skill if no one 
remembers how to perform a task that doctors use to perform before 
the new technologies arrived. The prospect of deskilling as a result of 
AI, though, seems especially unsettling because people are now 
talking about AIs outperforming humans in roles that have previously 
been thought to be the very centre of the practice of medicine, 
including diagnosis and prescription. 
One reason to be concerned about such deskilling is pragmatic 
(Carr 2015). We may worry about the implication of a loss of skill for 
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an individual’s — or perhaps the profession’s — ability to achieve 
some goal. Given that skills are eroded only when regular exercise of 
the skill becomes unnecessary, this effectively means a concern about 
what might happen if the technology fails. In the future, will doctors 
still be capable of diagnosing and treating people in those — hopefully 
— rare situations in which AI is not available, perhaps due to a failure 
of the power supply, or because of a system “crashing”? The force of 
this concern, then, will depend on a number of considerations. How 
likely is it that AI might fail and for how long? How important is the 
procedure that the AI facilitated and how urgent is it? What 
alternatives exist if doctors have lost the skills they would have 
previously relied upon in these circumstances? Interestingly, the 
balance of these considerations is likely to alter over time. The first 
generation of doctors to work with AI are less likely to be de-skilled 
than our subsequent generations. However, presumably AI is likely to 
become increasingly reliable over time, so it will matter less if doctors 
don’t have the skills of previous generations. 
However, a second set of worries about deskilling comes to the 
fore when the exercise of a skill is valuable for its own sake or because 
it is implicated in some other inherent good (Carr 2015; Danaher 
2018). It is plausible to think that the exercise of some skills – those 
constitutive of the virtues — is essential to having a flourishing human 
life (Vallor 2015). For instance, a person who never exercises practical 
wisdom — reasoned about their own ends — because they possessed 
an AI that deliberated on their behalf would not thereby be made any 
better off. 
How one should relate to the prospect of the deskilling of 
physicians as a result of the increasing presence of AI in medicine, 
then, depends upon whether one thinks of medicine as being solely 
instrumentally valuable in promoting health or hold that there are 
aspects of the practice of medicine — including, as we discuss further 




The pragmatic concerns about the impact of deskilling mentioned 
above are especially pressing given that the adoption of AI may often 
introduce a single point of failure in medical care: in some contexts, 
nearly everyone will be relying on the same system. Where AIs can 
perform tasks that were previously performed by human beings there is 
no reason why they cannot replace every human being who was 
performing that task. That is, a single AI could become responsible for 
all detection of skin cancer or analysis of chest x-rays, et cetera. 




Indeed, there is at least one ethical reason why this should occur, 
and two pragmatic/political reasons why it is likely to occur.  
The ethical case for AI monopoly rest on the duty of 
nonmaleficence (or alternatively on beneficence). Where there are 
multiple AIs that can perform a given task their performance is likely 
to vary. Failure to employ the best system will harm patients and so 
every institution will be under a moral obligation to adopt the best AI. 
The pragmatics of the marketing of AI, which will inevitably 
emphasise its performance using standard metrics, will also make it 
politically difficult to do anything else. No institution wants to be seen 
to be offering an inferior service, let alone to be seen to be putting the 
lives of their patients at risk. 
These arguments might be less compelling were there only to be 
minor differences in the performance of competing AIs. However, 
there are reasons to anticipate that one AI will often come to offer 
clearly superior performance as compared to its competitors at a 
particular task. The role played by big data in AI means that early 
competitive advantage, especially higher market share, is likely to lead 
to market dominance. The more users a system has, the more data it 
will have access to… and thus the more it can learn on the basis of this 
data. This dynamic will encourage effective monopoly with regards to 
the provision of particular services by AI. 
Should a medical AI malfunction, then, the consequences are 
likely to be disastrous. Where an incompetent or malicious human 
physician might harm dozens of patients, mistakes made by an AI may 
affect hundreds of thousands of patients. Indeed, even if an AI is not 
the sole provider of the service it provides, it is likely to be involved in 
the care of many more patients than any human being could be. The 
risks here are exacerbated by deskilling and automation bias, both of 
which make it less likely that physicians will detect problems at an 
early enough stage to avert widespread harms. 
The dangers posed by a single point of failure should prompt 
healthcare providers to employ more than one system in order that 
each system might serve as a backup if the others fail. Unfortunately, 
this may not always be possible, will usually be expensive where it is 
possible, and raises ethical questions of its own. It may not be possible 
because, for the reasons noted above, particular AI systems may 
outcompete all others at some particular task so as to effectively 
establish a monopoly. Even when multiple providers exist, employing 
more than one will usually be very expensive because a significant 
portion of the cost of AI is generated by the need to integrate the AI 
into a hospitals’ (or other institutions’) IT systems, workflow 
practices, and electronic medical records (where these exist). Indeed, 
often an institution’s practices and IT systems will need to be modified 
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to suit the demands of the AI. Having to do this for multiple systems 
greatly complexify the task and increases the expense of performing it. 
One of the ethical issues raised by the desire to sustain a fallback 
system, then, relates to the opportunity costs associated with this 
expense: the funds required to support this might instead be used to 
benefit patients more directly. In theory, it should be possible to 
evaluate the cost-effectiveness of deliberately diversifying when it 
comes to AI in key roles, which will depend to a large degree on the 
probability of either system failing, the consequences of failure in the 
absence of another AI alternative, and the cost of introducing a second 
system. However, in practice, it will be extremely difficult to estimate 
either the risk of failure of any given AI system or the costs of 
introducing a second system. 
 
(8) 
Thinking about a scenario in which there is a single provider of a 
key medical service also highlights the power possessed by whichever 
corporation designs this AI. There is a real risk of vested interests here, 
exacerbated by the potential such power allows for manufacturers of 
the AI to hold healthcare systems — and patients — to ransom when it 
comes to the pricing of the service and/or its future development. 
The introduction of AI will also have other implications for the 
distribution of power within healthcare systems, which are worth 
highlighting. We have already noted the way in which AI facilitates 
surveillance and thus empowers governments relative to citizens and 
corporations and institutions relative to individuals. Deskilling of 
physicians, should it occur, will reduce their social standing relative to 
other professions and their bargaining position within healthcare 
institutions. By contrast, the more institutions rely on AI, the more 
power computer scientists and IT departments will accrue within them. 
Although it is difficult to say too much about them in the abstract, 
these shifts in power within institutions are, we submit, one of the most 
likely and important impacts of the advent of medical AI. 
 
(9) 
The introduction of AI into medicine will also have implications 
for the allocation of responsibility for treatment decisions and adverse 
outcomes. Who should be held responsible when things go wrong as 
the result of a decision that depended crucially on the output of an AI? 
The manufacturer of the AI? The designer of the AI? The institution 
that purchased the AI? The physician? Or — most controversially — 
the machine itself?  




Discussions of these questions often stumble over the difficulty of 
providing a clear account of the autonomy, and the agency, of AI 
(Johnson and Noorman 2014). It is tempting to think of AI, especially 
AI involving machine learning, as creating a “responsibility gap”, such 
that it becomes impossible to allocate responsibility for any of the 
human parties, who could not have known precisely how the AI was 
going to act (Matthias 2004). Allocating responsibility to the machine 
itself is problematic because concepts like guilt, shame, and 
punishment, which are essential to our thinking about responsibility 
have little purchase when it comes to machines (Sparrow 2007).  
The problem with this line of thought is that mere uncertainty is 
no barrier to the allocation of responsibility. Uncertainty — about the 
precise aetiology of a patient’s symptoms, about whether a patient will 
respond to a particular drug, or about the future progress of the disease 
– is, after all, endemic to medicine and poses no especial difficulty 
when it comes to the attribution of moral or legal responsibility. 
Doctors must make decisions on the basis of the information available 
to them, and we assess their responsibility for adverse outcomes 
accordingly. While the cause of a patient’s death might be that a cancer 
did not respond to the treatment provided, the responsibility for the 
treatment decision remains the doctors and if anyone should be held 
morally responsible for the death this will depend on whether the 
decision was justified given the information available to the doctor 
about the likelihood that the cancer would respond. Similarly, even if 
doctors don’t know precisely how an AI will perform in relation to the 
treatment of a particular patient, this uncertainty doesn’t prevent us 
from assessing whether their decision to rely on it was reasonable or 
not and therefore whether they should be held responsible for the 
outcome of the course of treatment suggested by the AI. A 
“responsibility gap” would only emerge if the AI had agency — or at 
least a form of pseudo-agency — sufficient to imply that the machine 
might sometimes be morally, and not just causally, responsible for the 
outcome of acting on its advice. While one cannot rule out the 
possibility of machines developing such agency in the future, none of 
the AI systems currently on the horizon — not even those involving 
deep learning — are plausibly thought of as moral, or even 
pseudo-moral agents. 
If we think, instead, about an AI being reliable, or fallible, in the 
same way that a cancer medication is reliable, or fallible, then it is 
possible to make progress. Adopting such a deflationary account of the 
agency of AI allows to us to see how a familiar set of intuitions and 
principles can guide us in allocating responsibility for the outcomes of 
medical treatment involving AI along the same lines that we distribute 
it for outcomes involving any other complex technology. The design 
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and performance of the AI is the responsibility of the designer. 
Responsibility for the use of the AI will usually be shared between the 
physician and the healthcare institution within which the treatment is 
provided. Responsibility for acting on the basis of the output of the AI 
will rest with the treating physician.  
When something goes wrong, we must ask whether any of these 
parties failed in their obligations and attribute responsibility 
accordingly. In some cases, it may well be appropriate to conclude that 
none of these parties have done anything wrong. This may include 
cases where the AI behaved in an unanticipated fashion. Yet this no 
more involves a responsibility gap than when a patient has an allergic 
reaction to a drug that could not reasonably have been anticipated. As 
long as the machine is sufficiently reliable at the task it was expected to 
perform there may be no wrongdoing involved even in those cases 
where it fails.3 
There is, of course a second set of issues about how AI will 
impact on responsibility, which concerns the way the development of 
AI might change the duties of doctors and other healthcare providers. 
We have already suggested that institutions might come to be held to 
be under an obligation to purchase only the best AI available. 
Similarly, adopting AI is unlikely to remain optional for physicians 
very long: it will eventually become morally required. Whenever the 
use of machine brings about better outcomes for patients than human 




A key insight from the philosophy of technology is that tools are 
never just tools. They are never “neutral”. Instead, they shape our ends 
(Winner 2010). Tools have “affordances” – they make it easier to do 
some things as compared to others and by virtue of this fact they 
“frame” problems. Indeed, as we have already noted, by altering 
expectations, technologies may effectively require those who have 
access to them to adopt them and use them in the pursuit of particular 
ends.  
Like any technology, then, AI will have values built in. Some of 
these values will reflect choices made by their designers: some of them 
 
(3)  The fact that AIs involving machine learning may behave in ways that are difficult 
to predict is relevant to the responsibilities of designers and physicians, with the 
former having an obligation to try to reduce the uncertainty about the performance 
of the machine in any given case, and the latter having an obligation to take this 
fact into account when deciding whether to defer to an AI. Note, however, that the 
manufacturers and prescribers of drugs have the very same obligations. 




may reflect the society from which the data used to train the AI was 
sourced. However, some may be implicit in the very way AI frames the 
problems it then works to address.  
To a person with a hammer, everything looks like a nail. To a 
healthcare institution with an AI, everything may look like data. We 
believe that there is a real danger that taking up the tool of AI will 
subtly reshape the goals and nature of the practise of medicine: AI 
frames the problem of restoring and promoting health as a problem of 
information. To secure health we need more information: if we have 
more information, we will have more health. Verghese (2008) has 
observed how the advent of the computer, electronic medical records, 
and sophisticated medical texts has redirected the attention of 
physicians away from the body of the patient towards the patient’s 
data. AI risks a further level of abstraction away from the particular 
patient’s data towards data “in the cloud”, with individual patients and 
their data appearing primarily as data points. Of course, the practice of 
medicine has always involved the pursuit of understanding, both about 
the origins of a particular patient’s health problems and about the 
functioning of the human body and the nature and causes of its 
diseases. But as Verghese notes, historically, the pursuit of such 
understanding has involved “knowing how”– how to learn about the 
patient’s condition, as well as to cure it, by the exercise of skill 
practiced upon their body — as much as “knowing that”. The skills 
required for medicine in the future may be increasingly oriented 




Human contact, attention, and empathy have therapeutic value. 
They also play a more foundational role in the practice of medicine. 
Doctors are not (just) mechanics of the human body: medicine is 
fundamentally a caring profession. 
Although, as discussed above, some authors believe that AI has 
the potential to enhance care, medical AI might also be thought to 
constitute a threat to care as more and more medicine is delivered by 
machines. Machines can’t care (Sparrow and Sparrow 2006), so the 
more medical roles they take on the scarcer opportunities to 
demonstrate and experience care may become.  
It is already the case that medical practice has come to be 
dominated by data and test results at the cost of the patient-physician 
relationship (Verghese 2008). Increasingly, care of the sort that is 
expressed in touch, gesture and gaze in the course of ministrations to 
the patient’s physical body is the province of nurses and allied health 
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professionals. Insofar as these professions tend, in many parts of the 
world, to be dominated by women, the provision of this care is 
correspondingly gendered.4 The future of care will therefore depend in 
part on whether AI comes to replace the role of doctor or the role of 
nurse.  
Because it is much easier for AI to deal with “data” online than it 
is for machines to function alongside of human beings in the physical 
world there is every reason to expect that the work of doctors will be 
taken over by AI long before the work of nurses. One important reason 
to be concerned about this prospect relates to the role played by 
empathic human contact in the professional self-understanding of 
physicians – and consequently in their level of satisfaction with their 
work (Truog 2019). Another is the role of care in motivating 
behavioural change. Advice from a computer, or from a physician who 
is perceived to be little more than the mouthpiece of a computer, may 
not be sufficient to get people to follow a course of treatment or 
address the lifestyle factors that are implicated in their health 
problems. If people don’t feel that their doctor really cares about them, 
they may be less concerned with what their doctor thinks about them 
and thus to take their doctor’s advice. The extent to which people 
change their behaviour on the basis of advice provided by machines is, 
of course an empirical matter, about which we now have some data 
relating to the use of health and lifestyle apps: while this data is mixed, 
it has to be said that it does not inspire much confidence (Arigo 2019; 
Finkelstein et al. 2016; Jakicic et al. 2016; McKay et al. 2018). 
There is undoubtedly a risk of anachronism in worrying about the 
role of care in a future in which AI plays a greater role in medicine. If 
offered the choice between human-directed medicine, with lots of 
human contact, emotional support, and care, but with uncertain 
outcomes, and treatment by cold uncaring machines, which would cure 
them of their ills, patients might not unreasonably opt for the latter. In 
reality, for the reasons we have rehearsed here, patients are unlikely 
ever to be faced with such a stark choice: in practice, medicine that 
involves care is likely to be more effective. Given the institutional – 
and ethical – imperatives to embrace the use of AI in medicine, 
surveyed above, philosophers, bioethicists, and others concerned with 
the future of patient-centred medicine would be well advised to 
prioritise the development of a robust defence of the value and role of 
care in medicine in order to ensure that patients aren’t asked to 
confront this false dichotomy regardless. 
 
(4)  Most care actually occurs outside of the formal practice of medicine, in the home, 
and in that context is overwhelmingly provided by women. 





Finally, it will also be important to think about how AI might 
impact on our capacity to reason about, and defend, values more 
generally. As Habermas (1984), as well as other members of the 
Frankfurt School (Horkheimer and Adorno 1973), have argued at 
length, technical (or “instrumental”) rationality tends to crowd out 
reasoning about ends. AI promises to be an immensely powerful 
instrument. Yet medicine often requires us to think about ends. 
Especially at the beginning and end of life, questions about the nature 
of human flourishing, and/or about how to balance respect for 
autonomy versus a concern for the best interests of the patient, loom 
large. As we’ve noted, AI is likely to have some values already built in, 
but the opaque nature of many of these systems will make it especially 
difficult to allow for these values when it comes to making a decision 
based on the output of an AI. More generally, as we also observed 
earlier, where the internal operations of AI systems are opaque, it may 
be difficult to assess how the results of their prognostications should be 
taken into account in our thinking when we are thinking about ends. 
There is a significant danger that the power of AI to solve problems 
about how to do things will lead to doctors and patients spending less 
time deliberating about what to do. 
Conversely, when questions about ends do arise, AI will have 
little to offer. How much should I value the opportunity to have 
children in years to come? Should I pursue longevity at the risk of 
losing my dignity? Should I turn off my father’s ventilator? These 
aren’t things that machines will be able to reason about for the 
foreseeable future. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how machines could 
ever offer anything in relation to such questions given that machines 
can’t stand behind their claims in the way that people must before we 
should take their moral advice seriously (Gaita 2004). 
The role played by deliberation about ends in medicine therefore 
offers some comfort to those who worry about the possibility that AI’s 
will replace doctors entirely. Just how much comfort it offers depends 
upon how plausible we think it is that physicians will continue to be 
able to advise, or assist, patients in their deliberations about their 
values, and the implication of their values for their medical care, when 




Artificial intelligence has much to offer patients, doctors, and 
healthcare systems. Inevitably, with potential benefits it also brings 
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risks. We have highlighted the potential for AI to facilitate medical 
research, more accurate diagnosis, and more efficient medical 
administration. We have also drawn attention to the likelihood that AI 
will threaten patient privacy and facilitate surveillance. Biased data 
may jeopardise the benefits of AI and lack of explainability should 
sometimes – but not always – reduce the extent to which we are willing 
to rely on it. How much we are likely to be willing to trust AI, as well 
as how much we should, remain open questions. De-skilling of 
physicians as a result of AI is a significant risk: over reliance on AI 
may also render healthcare systems more fragile. We have highlighted 
the prospect that the introduction of AI into healthcare may empower 
some at the expense of others. We have also argued that the use of AI is 
less problematic for the allocation of responsibility than is often 
suggested. Finally, we have raised concerns about the ways in which 
AI might reframe medicine, impact on care, and discourage important 
arguments about values in medical decision making.  
A thorough investigation of any – let alone all – of these matters 
must needs draw on the combined expertise of physicians, engineers, 
data scientist, economists, political scientists, sociologists, and science 
and technology scholars, as well as philosophers and bioethicists. 
Pending the results of such a larger study, we hope this initial survey 
has at least identified some of the key questions as well as promising 
lines for future inquiries. We also hope that might be of some use to 
physicians and policy makers who are already grappling with the 
implications of AI and thus to realise the benefits of AI in medicine. 
 
 
The authors would like to thank Prof. Ruiping Fan, as well as the 
commentators, for their patience over the course of the drafting of this 
manuscript. Thanks are also due to Prof. Fan for the invitation to 
present an earlier version at the “International Workshop on ‘Ethics of 
Biomedical Technology and Artificial Intelligence’” at the City 
University of Hong Kong. Dr. Sparrow would also like to thank Dr. 
Derrick Au for a previous invitation to Hong Kong to present on AI in 
medicine and for conversations and discussion at the time. 





Adamson, Adewole S. and Avery Smith. “Machine Learning and Health Care 
Disparities in Dermatology.” JAMA Dermatology 154.11 (2018): 
1247–48. 




Arigo, Danielle, E. Jake-Schoffman, Kathleen Wolin, Ellen Beckjord, Eric 
Hekler, and B. Pagoto. "The History and Future of Digital Health in the 
Field of Behavioral Medicine." Journal of Behavioral Medicine 42.1 
(2019): 67-83.  
Ash, Joan S., Marc Berg, and Enrico Coiera. “Some Unintended 
Consequences of Information Technology in Health Care: The Nature of 
Patient Care Information System-related Errors.” Journal of the 
American Medical Informatics Association 11.2 (2004): 104–112. 
Barr, Alistair. “Google Mistakenly Tags Black People as ‘Gorillas’, Showing 
Limits of Algorithms.” The Wall Street Journal, July (2015). 
https://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/07/01/google-mistakenly-tags-black-
people-as-gorillas-showing-limits-of-algorithms/.  
Burrell, Jenna. “How the Machine ‘Thinks:’ Understanding Opacity in 
Machine Learning Algorithms.” Big Data & Society 3.1 (2016): 1–12. 
Cabitza, Federico, Raffaele Rasoini, and Gian Franco Gensini. “Unintended 
Consequences of Machine Learning in Medicine.” JAMA 318.6 (2017): 
517–18. 
Callahan, Daniel. Taming the Beloved Beast: How Medical Technology Costs 
Are Destroying Our Health Care System (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2009). 
Carr, Nicholas. The Glass Cage: Where Automation is Taking Us (London: 
Vintage, 2015). 
Cassell, Eric J. Doctoring: The Nature of Primary Care Medicine (Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
Chen, Jingfeng, Wei Wei, Chonghui Guo, Lin Tang, and Leilei Sun. “Textual 
analysis and visualization of research trends in data mining for 
electronic health records.” Health Policy and Technology 6.4 (2017): 
389–400. 
Cohen, I. Glenn. “Is There a Duty to Share Healthcare Data?” In Big Data, 
Health Law, and Bioethics, edited by I. G. Cohen, H. F. Lynch, E. 
Vayena, and U. Gasser (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2018, pp. 209–222). 
Danaher, John. “Toward an Ethics of AI Assistants: an Initial Framework" 
Philosophy & Technology. 31.4 (2018): 629-53. 
Dias, R. D., A. Gupta, and S. J. Yule. “Using Machine Learning to Assess 
Physician Competence: A Systematic Review.” Academic Medicine, 
94.3 (2018): 427–439. 
Dietvorst, Berkeley J., Joseph P. Simmons, and Cade Massey. “Algorithm 
106      
 
   
Aversion: People Erroneously Avoid Algorithms after Seeing Them 
Err.” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 144.1 (2015): 
114–26. 
Duhigg, Charles. “How Companies Learn Your Secrets.” The New York Times 
Magazine, February (2012). 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html.  
Esteva, Andre, Brett Kuprel, Roberto A. Novoa, Justin Ko, Susan M. Swetter, 
Helen M. Blau, and Sebastian Thrun. 2017. “Dermatologist-Level 
Classification of Skin Cancer with Deep Neural Networks.” Nature 
542.7639 (2017): 115–118. 
Finkelstein, Eric A., Benjamin A. Haaland, Marcel Bilger, Aarti 
Sahasranaman, Robert A. Sloan, Ei Ei Khaing Nang, and Kelly R. 
Evenson. "Effectiveness of Activity Trackers With and Without 
Incentives to Increase Physical Activity (TRIPPA): A Randomised 
Controlled Trial." The Lancet Diabetes and Endocrinology 4.12 (2016): 
983-995. 
Friedberg, Mark W., Peggy G. Chen, Kristin R. Va. Busum, Frances M. 
Aunon, Chau Pham, John P.Caloyeras, Soeren Mattke, Emma 
Pitchforth, Denise D. Quigley, Robert H. Brook, F. Jay Crosson, and 
Micheal Tutty. Factors Affecting Physician Professional Satisfaction 
and Their Implications for Patient Care, Health Systems, and Health 
Policy (Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 2013). 
Gaita, Raimond. Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception. London and New 
York: Routledge, 2004). 
Golden, Jeffrey Alan. 2017. “Deep Learning Algorithms for Detection of 
Lymph Node Metastases From Breast Cancer.” JAMA 318.22 (2017): 
2184. 
Gulshan, Varun, Lily Peng, Marc Coram, Martin C. Stumpe, Derek Wu, 
Arunachalam Narayanaswamy, Subhashini Venugopalan, Kasumi 
Widner, Tom Madams, Jorge Cuadros, Ramasamy Kim, Rajiv Raman, 
Philip C. Nelson, Jessica L. Mega, and Dale R. Webster. “Development 
and Validation of a Deep Learning Algorithm for Detection of Diabetic 
Retinopathy in Retinal Fundus Photographs.” JAMA 316.22 (2016): 
2402–2410. 
Gymrek, Melissa, Amy L. McGuire, David Golan, Eran Halperin, and Yaniv 
Erlich. “Identifying Personal Genomes by Surname Inference.” Science 
339.6117 (2013): 321–24. 
Habermas, Jürgen. The Theory of Communicative Action (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1984). 
Hall, Mark A., Elizabeth Dugan, Beiyao Zheng, and Aneil K. Mishra. “Trust in 
Physicians and Medical Institutions: What Is It, Can It Be Measured, 
and Does It Matter?” The Millbank Quarterly 79.4 (2001): 613–639.  
Hill, Robert G., Lynn Marie Sears, and Scott W. Melanson. “4000 Clicks: A 
Productivity Analysis of Electronic Medical Records in a Community 
Hospital ED.” American Journal of Emergency Medicine 31.11 (2013): 
1591–1594. 
Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor W. Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment 




(London: Allen Lane, 1973).  
Israni, Sonoo Thadaney and Abraham Verghese. “Humanizing Artificial 
Intelligence”. JAMA 321.1 (2019): 29–30. 
Jakicic, John M., Kelliann K. Davis, Renee J. Rogers, Wendy C. King, Marsha 
D. Marcus, Diane Helsel, Amy D. Rickman, Abdus S. Wahed, and 
Steven H. Belle. “Effect of Wearable Technology Combined With a 
Lifestyle Intervention on Long-term Weight Loss: The IDEA 
Randomized Clinical Trial.” JAMA 316.11(2016):1161–1171.  
Jha, Saurabh and Eric J. Topol. 2016. “Adapting to Artificial Intelligence: 
Radiologists and Pathologists as Information Specialists.” JAMA 316.22 
(2016): 2353–2354. 
Johnson, Deborah and Merel Noorman. “Artefactual Agency and Artefactual 
Moral Agency”. In Kroes P. and PP Verbeek (eds) The Moral Status of 
Technical Artefacts (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014). 
Kahn, Jeremy. “Alphabet’s DeepMind Is Trying to Transform Health 
Care–but Should an AI Company Have Your Health Records?” 




Kruse, Clemens Scott, Benjamin Frederick, Taylor Jacobson, and D. Kyle 
Monticone. “Cybersecurity in Healthcare: A Systematic Review of 
Modern Threats and Trends.” Technology and Health Care 25.1 (2017): 
1–10. 
Lecher, Colin. “What Happens When An Algorithm Cuts Your Healthcare.” 
The Verge (2017). 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/21/17144260/healthcare-medicaid-al
gorithm-arkansas-cerebral-palsy. 
Liu, Xiaoxuan, Livia Faes, Aditya U. Kale, Siegfried K. Wagner, Dun Jack Fu, 
Alice Bruynseels, Thushika Mahendiran, and Gabriella Moraes. “A 
Comparison of Deep Learning Performance against Health-Care 
Professionals in Detecting Diseases from Medical Imaging: A 
Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis.” The Lancet Digital Health 1.6 
(2019): e271–e297. 
London, Alex John. “Artificial Intelligence and Black-Box Medical Decisions: 
Accuracy versus Explainability.” Hastings Center Report 49.1 (2019): 
15–21. 
Lum, Kristian and William Isaac. “To Predict and Serve?” Significance 13.5 
(2016): 15–19. 
McKay, Fiona H., Christina Cheng, Annemarie Wright, Jane Shill, Hugh 
Stephens, and Mary Uccellini. "Evaluating mobile phone applications 
for health behaviour change: a systematic review." Journal of 
Telemedicine and Telecare 24.1 (2018): 22-30. 
Maddox, Thomas M., John S. Rumsfeld, and Phillip R. O. Payne. “Questions 
for Artificial Intelligence in Health Care.” JAMA 321.1 (2019): 31–32. 
Matthias, Andreas. “The Responsibility Gap: Ascribing Responsibility for the 
Actions of Learning Automata.” Ethics and Information Technology 6.3 
(2004): 175–183. 
108      
 
   
Mechanic, David. “Changing Medical Organization and the Erosion of Trust.” 
The Milbank Quarterly 74.2 (1996): 171–189. 
Mechanic, David. “The Impact of Managed Care on Patients’ Trust in Medical 
Care and Their Physicians.” JAMA 275.21 (2011): 1693–1697. 
Meskó, Bertalan, Gergely Hetényi, and Zsuzsanna Győrffy. “Will artificial 
intelligence solve the human resource crisis in healthcare?” BMC Health 
Services Research 18.1 (2018): 545. 
Nundy, Shantanu, Tara Montgomery, and Robert M. Wachter. “Promoting 
Trust Between Patients and Physicians in the Era of Artificial 
Intelligence.” JAMA 322.6 (2019): 497–498. 
O'Neil, Cathy. Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases 
Inequality and Threatens Democracy (London: Allen Lane, 2016). 
Pettit, Philip. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999). 
Price, W. Nicholson and I. Glenn Cohen. “Privacy in the age of medical big 
data.” Nature Medicine 25.1 (2019): 37–43. 
Rodwin, Marc A. Medicine, Money, and Morals: Physicians’ Conflicts of 
Interest (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
Russell, Stuart and Peter Norvig. Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach 
(2nd Edition) (New Jersey: Pearson Education Inc., 2003). 
Somakshekhar, S.P., R. Kumarc, A. Rauthan, K.R. Arun, P. Patil, and Y.E. 
Ramya. “Abstract S6-07: Double blinded validation study to assess 
performance of IBM artificial intelligence platform, Watson for 
oncology in comparison with Manipal multidisciplinary tumour board – 
First study of 638 breast cancer cases.” Cancer Research 77.4 
Supplement (2017): S6–07. 
Sparrow, Robert. “Killer Robots.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 24.1 (2007): 
62-77.  
Sparrow, Robert, and Linda Sparrow. “In the Hands of Machines?  The Future 
of Aged Care.” Minds and Machines 16 (2006): 141-161.  
Spice, Byron. “Questioning the Fairness of Targeting Ads Online.” Carnegie 
Mellon University News, July (2015). 
https://www.cmu.edu/news/stories/archives/2015/july/online-ads-resea
rch.html.  
Strickland, Eliza. “Layoffs at Watson Health Reveal IBM’s Problem With 
AI.” IEEE Spectrum, June (2018). 
https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-human-os/robotics/artificial-intelligence/l
ayoffs-at-watson-health-reveal-ibms-problem-with-ai.  
Suresh, Harini and John V. Guttag. “A Framework for Understanding 
Unintended Consequences of Machine Learning.” arXiv: 1901.10002 
[cs.LG] (2019). https://arxiv.org/abs/1901.10002.  
Terrasse, Mélanie, Moti Gorin, and Dominic Sisti. “Social Media, E-Health, 
and Medical Ethics.” Hastings Center Report 49.1 (2019): 24–33. 
Toll, Elizabeth. “The Cost of Technology.” JAMA 307.23 (2012): 2011–2012. 
Topol, Eric J. Deep Medicine: How Artificial Intelligence Can Make 
Healthcare Human Again (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2019). 
Truog, Robert D. "Of Slide Rules and Stethoscopes: AI and the Future of 




Doctoring." Hastings Center Report 49.5 (2019): 3. 
Vallor, Shannon. “Moral Deskilling and Upskilling in a New Machine Age: 
Reflections on the Ambiguous Future of Character.” Philosophy & 
Technology 28.1 (2015): 107-24. 
Vayena, Effy, Alessandro Blasimme, and I. Glenn Cohen. “Machine Learning 
in Medicine: Addressing Ethical Challenges.” PLoS Medicine 15.11 
(2018): 4–7. 
Verghese, Abraham. “Culture Shock — Patient as Icon, Icon as Patient.” New 
England Journal of Medicine 359.26 (2008): 2748–2751. 
Verghese, Abraham, Nigam H. Shah, and Robert A. Harrington. “What This 
Computer Needs Is a Physician: Humanism and Artificial Intelligence.” 
JAMA 319.1 (2019): 19–20. 
Wachter, Robert M. The Digital Doctor: Hope, Hype, and Harm at the Dawn 
of Medicine’s Computer Age (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Education, 
2015). 
Watson, David S., Jenny Krutzinna, Ian N. Bruce, Christopher E. M. Griffiths, 
Iain B. McInnes, Michael R. Barnes, and Luciano Floridi. “Clinical 
Applications of Machine Learning Algorithms: Beyond the Black Box.” 
BMJ (Online) 364 (2019): 10–13, March. 
Weber, Griffin M., Kenneth D. Mandl, and Isaac S. Kohane. “Finding the 
Missing Link for Big Biomedical Data.” JAMA 311.24 (2014): 
2479–2480. 
Winner, Langdon. The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age 
of High Technology. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010). 
 
